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Abstract
The capacity of private information retrieval (PIR) from databases coded using maximum
distance separable (MDS) codes has been previously characterized by Banawan and Ulukus,
where it was assumed that the messages are encoded and stored separably into the databases.
This assumption was also usually taken in other related works in the literature, and this capacity
is usually referred to as the MDS-PIR capacity colloquially. In this work, we considered the
question if and when this capacity barrier can be broken through joint encoding and storing of
the messages. Our main results are two classes of novel code constructions which allow joint
encoding as well as the corresponding PIR protocols, which indeed outperform the separate
MDS-coded systems. Moreover, we show that a simple but novel expansion technique allows
us to generalize these two classes of codes, resulting in a wider range of the cases where this
capacity barrier can be broken.
1 Introduction
Private information retrieval (PIR) [1] has attracted significant attention from researchers in the
fields of theoretical computer science, cryptography, information theory, and coding theory. In
the classical PIR model, a user wishes to retrieve one of the K available messages, from N non-
communicating databases, each of which has a copy of these K messages. User privacy needs to
be preserved during the retrieval process, which requires that the identity of the desired message
not be revealed to any single database. To accomplish the task efficiently, good codes need to be
designed such that the least amount of data should be downloaded. The inverse of the minimum
amount of the download data per-bit of desired message is referred to as the capacity of the PIR
system. The capacity of the classical PIR system was characterized precisely in a recent work by
Sun and Jafar [2].
In distributed systems, databases may fail; moreover, each storage node (database) is also
constrained on the storage space. Erasure codes can be used to improve both storage efficiency
and failure resistance, which motivated the investigation of PIR from data encoded with maximum
distance separable (MDS) codes [3–7], with coding parameter (N,T ), i.e., the messages can be
recovered by accessing any T databases. The capacity of PIR from MDS-coded databases (MDS-
PIR) was characterized by Banawan and Ulukus [5], which is usually referred to as the MDS-PIR
capacity colloquially.
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In all these existing works, the storage code has been designed such that each message is inde-
pendently encoded and stored into the dababases, and thus can also be recovered individually. In
fact, even when the storage codes are not necessarily MDS codes, most existing works on private
information retrieval have assumed this separate coding architecture [8–13], and the only excep-
tions1 we are aware of are [20–22]. Though this architecture of separately encoding of each message
offers a simple storage solution with good data reliability, it is by no means the only possible MDS
storage coding strategy. Instead, the messages can be stored jointly using an MDS code, which
could provide the same level of data reliability at the same amount of storage overhead. Motivated
by this observation2, we ask the following natural question: When can the MDS-PIR capacity
barrier, which was established in [5] for separately encoding of the messages using an MDS code,
be broken, by allowing jointly encoding of the messages using an MDS code?
In this work, we show that there are many cases, where by jointly encoding and storing the
messages, the messages can be protected using an (N,T ) MDS code, but retrieved with less data
download than the separate coding architecture. In other words, the capacity barrier for separately
encoding of the messages can be broken for these cases. More precisely, the mathematical question
we ask is under what (K,N, T ) parameters, jointly encoding and storing the MDS-coded messages
can provide strict PIR retrieval rate improvement; we show that this can be done at least in the
following two cases:
• (K,N, T ) = (2, N, 2) and N ≥ 3;
• (K,N, T ) = (K,K + 1,K) and K ≥ 2.
To establish this result, we provide two novel code constructions and PIR protocols which yield
strict performance improvement over the strategy of encoding and storing messages separately using
an MDS code. Moreover, we show that through a simple but novel code expansion technique, the
MDS-PIR capacity barrier can also be broken for the following cases for an arbitrary integer m ≥ 1:
• (K,N, T ) = (2,mN, 2m) and N ≥ 3;
• (K,N, T ) = (K,m(K + 1),mK) and K ≥ 2.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a precise description of
the system model and problem formulation. In Section 3 and Section 4, we provide two novel joint
coding storage codes and PIR protocols. In Section 5 we present a technique which yields more
general classes of the codes which can strictly improve upon separately encoding and storing the
messages. Section 6 finally concludes the paper.
2 System Model and Problem Formulation
In this section, we first provide a formal description of the system model, then proceed to pose
the problem we seek to answer in this work. A couple of additional remarks to clarify the relation
between our system model and those seen in the literature are given at the end of the section.
1While in this work, we focus exclusively on the metric of PIR capacity for MDS codes, there is another interesting
line of work in coding theory [14–19] that focuses on a different metric - virtual server rate [16] and studies how to
jointly code the messages such that a minimum number of servers is used to simulate existing PIR protocols and here
as the resulting joint storage code is not required to be MDS, it often turns out to be non-MDS.
2This observation was first briefly mentioned as a footnote in [21], which can be further traced back to a simple
code example given in [20].
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2.1 System Model
There are a total of K mutually independent messages W 1,W 2, . . . ,WK in the system. Each
message is uniformly distributed over XL, i.e., the set of length-L sequences in the finite alphabet
X . The messages are MDS-coded and then distributed to N databases, such that from any T
databases, the messages can be fully recovered. Since the messages are (N,T ) MDS-coded, it is
without loss of generality to assume that L ·K =M · T for some integer M .
When a user wishes to retrieve a particular message W k
∗
, N queries Q
[k∗]
1:N = (Q
[k∗]
1 , . . . , Q
[k∗]
N )
are sent to the databases, where Q
[k∗]
n is the query for database-n. The retrieval needs to be
information theoretically private, i.e., any database is not able to infer any knowledge as to which
message is being requested. For this purpose, a random key F in the set F is used together with the
desired message index k∗ to generate the set of queries Q
[k∗]
1:N . Each query Q
[k∗]
n belongs to the set
of allowed queries for database-n, denoted as Qn. After receiving query Q
[k∗]
n , database-n responds
with an answer A
[k∗]
n . Each symbol in the answers from database-n belongs to a finite field An, and
the answers may have multiple (and different numbers of) symbols. Using the answers A
[k∗]
1:N from
all N databases, together with F and k∗, the user then reconstructs Wˆ k
∗
. We shall refer to such a
system as a (K,N, T ) MDS-PIR system.
A more rigorous definition of a (K,N, T ) system can be specified by a set of coding functions
as follows. In the following, we denote the cardinality of a set B as |B|.
Definition 1 A (K,N, T ) MDS-PIR code consists of the following coding components:
1. A set of MDS encoding functions:
Φn := X
LK → XM , n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (1)
where each Φn encodes all the messages together into the information to be stored at database-
n.
2. A set of MDS decoding recovery functions:
ΨT : X
LK → XLK , (2)
for each T ⊆ {1, . . . , N} such that |T | = T , whose outputs are denoted as W˜ 1:KT ;
3. A query function
φn : {1, . . . ,K} × F → Qn, n ∈ {1, . . . , N},
i.e., for retrieving message W k
∗
, the user sends the query Q
[k∗]
n = φn(k
∗,F) to database-n;
4. An answer length function
ℓn : Qn → {0, 1, . . .}, n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (3)
i.e., the length of the answer from each database, a non-negative integer, is a deterministic
function of the query, but not the particular realization of the messages;
5. An answer generating function
φ(qn)n : X
M ×Qn → A
ℓn
n , qn ∈ Qn, n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (4)
i.e., the answer when qn = Q
[k∗]
n is the query received by database-n;
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6. A reconstruction function
ψ :
N∏
n=1
Aℓnn × {1, . . . ,K} × F → X
L, (5)
i.e., after receiving the answers, the user reconstructs the message as Wˆ k
∗
= ψ(A
[k∗]
1:N , k
∗,F).
These functions satisfy the following three requirements:
1. MDS recoverable: For any T ⊆ {1, . . . , N} such that |T | = T , we have W˜ 1:KT =W
1:K .
2. Retrieval correctness: For any k∗ ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, we have Wˆ k
∗
=W k
∗
.
3. Privacy: For every k, k′ ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, n ∈ {1, . . . , N} and q ∈ Qn,
Pr(Q[k]n = q) = Pr(Q
[k′]
n = q). (6)
The retrieval rate is defined as
R :=
L log |X |∑N
n=1 E(ℓn) log |An|
. (7)
This is the number of bits of desired message information that can be privately retrieved per bit
of downloaded data. The maximum possible retrieval rate is referred to as the capacity of the
(K,N, T ) system.
2.2 Separate vs. Joint MDS Storage Codes
In the general problem definition we have provided above, the MDS encoding functions Φn allow the
messages to be jointly encoded. For example, suppose we have K = 2 messages, N = 3 databases
and from any T = 2 databases, we may decode both messages. A simple jointly encoded MDS
storage code is as follows. Each message has L = 2 bits, denoted as W 1 = (a1, a2),W
2 = (b1, b2).
Each database storesM = LK/T = 2 bits, i.e., database-1 stores (a1, a2), database-2 stores (b1, b2)
and database-3 stores (a1 + b1, a2 + b2). However, in almost all existing works in the literature,
e.g., [3, 5, 7, 23–26], the messages are encoded separately. In other words, the MDS encoding
functions have the special form
Φn = (Φ
1
n,Φ
2
n, . . . ,Φ
K
n ), (8)
where
Φkn : X
L → XM/K , n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, (9)
which encodes message W k to its MDS-coded form to be stored at database-n. Correspondingly,
the MDS decoding functions have the form
ΨT = (Ψ
1
T ,Ψ
2
T , . . . ,Ψ
K
T ), (10)
where
ΨkT : X
L → XL, k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, (11)
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which decodes message-k from the information regarding W k stored in the databases in the set
T . Particularly, since most practical MDS codes are linear, several existing works have directly
assumed the MDS encoding functions to be linear, and moreover, the component coding functions
Φkn for different messages W
k’s are the same; see e.g., [5,23]. In other words, in this class of codes,
the encoding function Φkn can be written as the multiplication of the message vector W
k with an
L×M/K encoding matrix Gn, whose elements are also in the finite field X . To compare with the
jointly encoded MDS storage example above, we consider the same setting where K = 2 messages,
L = 2 bits per message, N = 3 servers, and the MDS parameter T = 2. A separate MDS storage
code where each database storesM/K = 1 bit per message is as follows. Database-1 stores (a1, b1),
database-2 stores (a2, b2) and database-3 stores (a1+a2, b1+b2). It is easy to see that for separately
encoded MDS storage codes, the storage space is divided evenly to each message and each divided
storage space can only be a function of the corresponding message.
Let us denote the capacity of (K,N, T ) MDS-PIR system as C(K,N, T ), that of separate MDS
coding as C⊥(K,N, T ), and that of separate linear MDS coding with a uniform component function
as C⊕(K,N, T ). It is clear from the definitions that
C(K,N, T ) ≥ C⊥(K,N, T ) ≥ C⊕(K,N, T ). (12)
It was shown in [5] that
C⊕(K,N, T ) =
(
1 +
T
N
+ · · ·+
(
T
N
)K−1)−1
. (13)
However, a close inspection of the converse proof in [5] reveals that
C⊥(K,N, T ) = C⊕(K,N, T ). (14)
The issue we thus wish to understand in this work is the relation between C(K,N, T ) and
C⊥(K,N, T ). In particular, we wish to identify the set of the (K,N, T ) triples such that
C(K,N, T ) > C⊥(K,N, T ), (15)
if the set is not empty. We shall show in this work that such triples indeed exist, and they in fact
span a rather wide range.
2.3 Further Remarks on the System Model
The result in [5] is in fact slightly stronger than we have stated in (13). Let us assume a par-
ticular MDS storage code C is used in the (K,N, T ) system, then the corresponding capacities of
the (K,N, T ) systems as described above can be denoted as C(K,N, T, C), C⊥(K,N, T, C), and
C⊕(K,N, T, C), respectively. The result in [5] can then be stated as that for any linear MDS code
C,
C⊕(K,N, T, C) = C⊕(K,N, T ) =
(
1 +
T
N
+ · · ·+
(
T
N
)K−1)−1
. (16)
It is natural to ask whether for any particular MDS code C, which is not necessarily linear or does not
necessarily use a uniform component MDS coding function, whether C⊥(K,N, T, C) = C⊥(K,N, T ),
5
and more generally whether for any MDS code C, C(K,N, T, C) = C(K,N, T ). We believe this is
in general not true, however, it appears difficult to prove or disprove this conjecture.
The MDS recovery requirement implies the following information theoretic relation:∑
n∈T
H(Φn(W
1:K)) = KL log |X |, (17)
H(W 1:K |Φn(W
1:K), n ∈ T ) = 0, (18)
for any T ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , N} and |T | = T . These conditions can be used to derive converse results for
a (K,N, T ) system, and sometimes are stated directly (e.g. [24]) as the MDS recovery requirement,
instead of enforcing the MDS recovery property on the coding functions.
3 Code Construction: (K,N, T ) = (2, N, 2), N ≥ 3
In this section, we present the storage and PIR code construction when K = T = 2, N ≥ 3 and
show that the PIR rate achieved with the proposed joint MDS storage code is strictly higher than
the capacity of PIR with separate MDS storage code, i.e., C(2, N, 2) > C⊥(2, N, 2).
3.1 Example: N = 4
To illustrate the main idea in a simpler setting, we start with an example where N = 4. We set
message size L = 3 so that each message consists of 3 symbols from F3. Denote W
1 = (a0; a1; a2) ∈
F
3×1
3 ,W
2 = (b0; b1; b2) ∈ F
3×1
3 .
Storage Code: From the joint MDS storage code constraint, each database stores LKT = 3
symbols, and the stored variables are specified in the following table.
Table 1: Stored Variables.
Database-1 Database-2 Database-3 Database-4
a0 b0 a1 + b0 2a2 + b0
a1 b1 a2 + b1 2a0 + b1
a2 b2 a0 + b2 2a1 + b2
It is easy to verify that we may recover both messages from the storage of any 2 databases. For
example, consider database-3 and database-4. It suffices to show that (a1− 2a2; a2− 2a0; a0− 2a1)
are invertible to W 1 = (a0; a1; a2). Equivalently, we show that the following matrix has full rank
over F3. 
 0 1 −2−2 0 1
1 −2 0

→

 0 1 11 0 1
1 1 0

→ det

 0 1 11 0 1
1 1 0

 = 2 6= 0 (19)
PIR Code: When we retrieve W 1, the answers are shown in the following table.
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Table 2: Answers for W 1.
F Database-1 Database-2 Database-3 Database-4
0 a0 b0 a1 + b0 2a2 + b0
1 a1 b1 a2 + b1 2a0 + b1
2 a2 b2 a0 + b2 2a1 + b2
When we retrieve W 2, the answers are shown in the following table.
Table 3: Answers for W 2.
F Database-1 Database-2 Database-3 Database-4
0 a0 b0 a0 + b2 2a0 + b1
1 a1 b1 a1 + b0 2a1 + b2
2 a2 b2 a2 + b1 2a2 + b0
Correctness and Privacy: Both correctness and privacy are easy to verify. Correctness
follows from the observation that from the 4 symbols downloaded (one from each database), we
may decode the 3 desired symbols as only 1 undesired symbol appears in the answers. Privacy
is guaranteed because no matter which message is desired, for each database, the answers are
identically distributed. For example, consider database-3. The answers are equally likely to be
a0 + b2, a1 + b0 and a2 + b1, regardless of the desired message index.
Rate that outperforms separate MDS-PIR capacity: The desired message has L = 3
symbols and we are downloading one symbol from each database, ln = 1,∀n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. Then the
rate achieved is L∑
n
ln
= 34 ≤ C(2, 4, 2), which is strictly higher than C⊥(2, 4, 2) = (1 +
2
4)
−1 = 23 ,
the capacity of separate MDS storage code.
3.2 General Proof: Arbitrary N ≥ 3
We set message size L = N − 1, then each message consists of N − 1 symbols from Fpm for a prime
number p and an integer m such that pm ≥ (N − 3)(N − 1)+2. The primitive element of the finite
filed Fpm is denoted as α. Denote W
1 = (a0; a1; · · · ; aN−2) ∈ F
(N−1)×1
pm ,W
2 = (b0; b1; · · · ; bN−2) ∈
F
(N−1)×1
pm .
Storage Code: From the joint MDS storage code constraint, each database stores LKT = N−1
symbols, and the stored variables Sn ∈ F
(N−1)×1
pm , n ∈ {1, · · · , N} are set as follows.
Denote the cyclicly shifted message vector as W˜ 1(i) = (ai; ai+1; · · · ; ai+N−2), i ∈ {1, · · · , N−2}
where i = i mod (N − 1), i.e., the symbol indices are interpreted modulo N − 1.
S1 = W
1 (20)
S2 = W
2 (21)
S3 = αW˜
1(1) +W 2 (22)
... (23)
Sn = α
n−2W˜ 1(n− 2) +W 2 (24)
... (25)
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SN = α
N−2W˜ 1(N − 2) +W 2 (26)
Specifically,
S1 = (S1,0; · · · ;S1,N−2) = (a0; · · · ; aN−2) (27)
S2 = (S2,0; · · · ;S2,N−2) = (b0; · · · ; bN−2) (28)
Sn = (Sn,0; · · · ;Sn,N−2) = (α
n−2an−2 + b0; · · · ;α
n−2an+N−4 + bN−2), n ∈ {3, · · · , N} (29)
The proof that the above storage code satisfies the MDS criterion is deferred to Section 3.2.1.
PIR Code: When we retrieve W 1, the answers are set as follows. F is uniformly distributed
over {0, 1, · · · , N − 2}. When F = f ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N − 2}, we set
A
[1]
1 = S1,f = af (30)
A
[1]
2 = S2,f = bf (31)
A
[1]
3 = S3,f = αaf+1 + bf (32)
... (33)
A[1]n = Sn,f = α
n−2af+n−2 + bf (34)
... (35)
A
[1]
N = SN,f = α
N−2af+N−2 + bf (36)
When we retrieveW 2, the answers are set as follows. F is uniformly distributed over {0, 1, · · · , N−
2}. When F = f ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N − 2}, we set
A
[2]
1 = S1,f = af (37)
A
[2]
2 = S2,f = bf (38)
A
[2]
3 = S3,f−1 = αaf + bf−1 (39)
... (40)
A[2]n = Sn,f−(n−2) = α
n−2af + bf−(n−2) (41)
... (42)
A
[2]
N = SN,f−(N−2) = α
N−2af + bf−(N−2) (43)
Correctness and Privacy: Similar to the example presented in the previous section, both
correctness and privacy are easy to verify. Correctness follows from the observation that the N sym-
bols downloaded (one from each database) contain all N − 1 desired symbols and only 1 undesired
symbol. Specifically, whenW 1 is desired, we may recover W 1 from (A
[1]
1 , A
[1]
3 −A
[1]
2 , · · · , A
[1]
N −A
[1]
2 )
and when W 2 is desired, we may recover W 2 from (A
[2]
2 , A
[2]
3 − αA
[2]
1 , · · · , A
[2]
N − α
N−2A
[2]
1 ). Pri-
vacy is guaranteed because no matter which message is desired, A
[1]
n and A
[2]
n are identically dis-
tributed. For n = 1, 2, this is trivial to see; when n ≥ 3, since A
[1]
n = Sn,f , A
[2]
n = Sn,f−(n−2) and
f ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N − 2}, it is seen that f and f − (n− 2) = (f − (n − 2)) mod (N − 2) take values
from the same set {0, 1, · · · , N − 2} for any n, and moreover the queries follow the same uniform
distribution on this set for both messages.
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Rate that outperforms separate MDS-PIR capacity: The desired message has L = N−1
symbols and we are downloading one symbol from each database, ln = 1,∀n ∈ {1, · · · , N}. Then the
rate achieved is L∑
n
ln
= N−1N ≤ C(2, N, 2). When N ≥ 3, C(2, N, 2) ≥
N−1
N >
N
N+2 = C⊥(2, N, 2),
the capacity of separate MDS storage code.
3.2.1 Proof of MDS storage criterion
We show that from the stored variables of any two databases, Si, Sj, i < j, i, j ∈ {1, · · · , N} we
may recover both W 1 and W 2.
When i = 1, 2, the proof is immediate. Henceforth we consider i ≥ 3. To show that from
(Si, Sj) we may recover (W
1,W 2), it suffices to prove that from Si−Sj, we may recover W
1. Note
that
Si − Sj = α
i−2W˜ 1(i− 2)− αj−2W˜ 1(j − 2) (44)
= (αi−2ai−2 − α
j−2aj−2; · · · ;α
i−2ai+N−4 − α
j−2aj+N−4) (45)
= Ci,j(a0; · · · ; aN−2) (46)
where Ci,j is an (N − 1)× (N − 1) circulant matrix whose rows consist of all possible cyclic shifts
of the following 1× (N − 1) row vector,
c = (c0, c1, · · · , cN−2) = (α
i−2, 0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
j−i−1 0′s
,−αj−2, 0, · · · , 0). (47)
We are left to prove the circulant matrix Ci,j has full rank. From a result by Ingleton [27], a
circulant matrix has full rank if the following two polynomials have no common root.
f(x) = c0 + c1x+ · · · cN−2x
N−2 = αi−2 − αj−2xj−i, (48)
g(x) = xN−1 − 1. (49)
To show that f(x), g(x) have no common root for all integers i, j, 3 ≤ i < j ≤ N , we prove by
contradiction. Suppose on the contrary that there exists an element x0 ∈ Fpm and two integers
i, j, 3 ≤ i < j ≤ N such that f(x0) = 0 and g(x0) = 0, i.e.,
αi−2 = αj−2x0
j−i (50)
xN−10 = 1 (51)
Taking (50) to the (N − 1)-th power, we have
α(i−2)(N−1) = α(j−2)(N−1)(x0
N−1)j−i (52)
(51)
⇒ α(i−2)(N−1) = α(j−2)(N−1) (53)
⇒ 1 = α(j−i)(N−1) (54)
Note that (j − i)(N − 1) ≤ (N − 3)(N − 1). Combining with the assumption that pm − 2 ≥
(N − 3)(N − 1) and α is a primitive element of Fpm, we have [28]
1 /∈ {α,α2, α3, · · · , αp
m−2} ⇒ α(j−i)(N−1) 6= 1, (55)
which contradicts (54). The proof is now complete.
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Remark: The field size may be further reduced by a result from [29]. To ensure Ci,j has full
rank, it suffices to ensure f(x) and g′(x) = xr − 1 has no common root, where N − 1 = rpl and
p, r are co-prime [29]. Using this result and following similar proof steps as above, we may set
pm ≥ (N − 3)r+2. Note that here r depends on p, so to find the smallest field size, we may search
by first fixing p.
4 Code Construction: (K,N, T ) = (K,K + 1, K), K ≥ 2
In this section, we present the storage and PIR code construction when N = K + 1 = T + 1 and
show that the PIR rate achieved with the proposed joint MDS storage code is strictly higher than
the capacity of PIR with separate MDS storage code, i.e., C(K,K + 1,K) > C⊥(K,K + 1,K).
4.1 Example: (K,N, T ) = (3, 4, 3)
To illustrate the main idea in a simpler setting, we start with an example where K = 3, N =
4, T = 3. We set message size L = 2 so that each message consists of 2 bits from F2. Denote
W 1 = (a1; a2),W
2 = (b1; b2),W
3 = (c1; c2).
Storage Code: From the joint MDS storage code constraint, each database stores LKT = 2
bits, and the stored variables are specified in the following table.
Table 4: Stored Variables.
Database-1 Database-2 Database-3 Database-4
a1 b1 c1 a1 + b1 + c1
a2 b2 c2 a2 + b2 + c2
The MDS storage criterion is easily verified, i.e., we may recover both messages from the storage
of any 3 databases.
PIR Code: When we retrieve W 1, the answers are shown in the following table.
Table 5: Answers for W 1.
F Database-1 Database-2 Database-3 Database-4
1 a2 b1 c1 a1 + b1 + c1
2 a1 b2 c2 a2 + b2 + c2
When we retrieve W 2 or W 3, the answers are shown in the following tables.
Table 6: Answers for W 2.
F Database-1 Database-2 Database-3 Database-4
1 a1 b2 c1 a1 + b1 + c1
2 a2 b1 c2 a2 + b2 + c2
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Table 7: Answers for W 3.
F Database-1 Database-2 Database-3 Database-4
1 a1 b1 c2 a1 + b1 + c1
2 a2 b2 c1 a2 + b2 + c2
Correctness and Privacy: Both correctness and privacy are easy to see.
Rate that outperforms separate MDS-PIR capacity: The rate achieved is L∑
n
ln
= 24 =
1
2 ≤ C(3, 4, 3), which is strictly higher than C⊥(3, 4, 3) = (1 +
3
4 + (
3
4)
2)−1 = 1637 , the capacity of
separate MDS storage code.
4.2 General Proof: (K,N, T ) = (K,K + 1, K), K ≥ 2
The proof is a simple generalization of the example presented above. We set L = 2, and each
message consists of 2 bits from F2. Denote W
k = (W k1 ;W
k
2 ), k ∈ {1, · · · ,K}.
Storage Code: Each database stores LKT = 2 bits, and the stored variables are specified in
the following table. Note that K = T = N − 1.
Table 8: Stored Variables.
Database-1 Database-2 · · · Database-(N − 1) Database-N
W 11 W
2
1 · · · W
K
1
∑K
k=1W
k
1
W 12 W
2
2 · · · W
K
2
∑K
k=1W
k
2
The MDS storage criterion is easily verified, i.e., we may recover both messages from the storage
of any T = N − 1 databases.
PIR Code: When we retrieve W k, the answers are shown in the following table.
Table 9: Answers for W k.
F Database-1 · · · Database-k · · · Database-(N − 1) Database-N
1 W 11 · · · W
k
2 · · · W
K
1
∑K
k=1W
k
1
2 W 12 · · · W
k
1 · · · W
K
2
∑K
k=1W
k
2
Correctness and Privacy: Follow immediately.
Rate that outperforms separate MDS-PIR capacity: The rate achieved is L∑
n
ln
= 2N ≤
C(K,K+1,K), while the capacity of separate MDS storage code is C⊥(K,K+1,K) = (1+
N−1
N +
· · · + (N−1N )
N−1)−1 =
1−N−1
N
1−(N−1
N
)N
= 1
N(1−(N−1
N
)N )
. To prove C(K,K + 1,K) > C⊥(K,K + 1,K), it
remains to show that
2
N
>
1
N(1− (N−1N )
N )
(56)
⇔ (1−
1
N
)N <
1
2
(57)
⇐ (1−
1
N
)N ≤
1
e
<
1
2
. (58)
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The proof is thus complete.
5 Regime Expansion Building upon Base Codes
We show that the two classes of base codes presented in previous sections for (K,N, T ) systems can
be extended to (K,mN,mT ) systems (m is a positive integer). We present this result in the next
two subsections, one for each class of base codes. Let us start from the simpler case of (K,K+1,K)
systems.
5.1 From (K,K + 1, K) to (K,m(K + 1), mK) Systems
We show that C(K,m(K + 1),mK) > C⊥(K,m(K + 1),mK), where K ≥ 2 and m is a positive
integer.
The key idea is that we may split the messages and databases into m generic copies so that
the same PIR rate is preserved. Note that the separate MDS-PIR capacity is a function of TN , i.e.,
C⊥(K,m(K + 1),mK) = C⊥(K,K + 1,K). As C(K,K + 1,K) > C⊥(K,K + 1,K), it suffices to
provide a joint MDS storage code for a (K,m(K+1),mK) system that achieves the same PIR rate
as that of a (K,K + 1,K) system (i.e., rate 2K+1). Such a storage and PIR code construction is
presented next.
Each message is “multiplied” by m so that we set L = 2m, and each message consists of 2m
symbols from Fq, where q is an integer power of a prime number and is no fewer than (m + 1)K.
To highlight that the message symbols form two segments, we denote W k = (Wk1 ;W
k
2) ∈ F
2×m
q ,
where Wki = (W
k
i,1, · · · ,W
k
i,m) ∈ F
1×m
q , i ∈ {1, 2}.
Storage Code: Each database stores LKT = 2 symbols, as specified in the following ta-
ble. For ease of presentation, the N = m(K + 1) databases are divided into K + 1 groups (m
databases each) and labelled as DB(1, 1), · · · ,DB(1,m), · · · ,DB(K + 1,m). Denote a group
of databases as DB(k, :) =
(
DB(k, 1), · · · ,DB(k,m)
)
, k ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,K + 1}. A database in
group k, k ∈ {1, · · · ,K} stores 2 distinct W k symbols (one from Wk1 and one from W
k
2). The
(K + 1)-th group of databases store generic combinations of the message symbols. Denote W1 =
((W11)
T ; · · · ; (WK1 )
T ) ∈ FmK×1q ,W2 = ((W
1
2)
T ; · · · ; (WK2 )
T ) ∈ FmK×1q . C(i, :) ∈ F
1×mK
q , i ∈
{1, · · · ,m} denotes the i-th row of an m×mK Cauchy matrix C with elements C(i, j) in the form
C(i, j) =
1
αi − βj
, αi 6= βj ,∀i ∈ {1, · · · ,m}, j ∈ {1, · · · ,mK}. (59)
Note that q ≥ (m+ 1)K, therefore, such distinct αi’s and βj’s exist.
Table 10: Stored Variables.
DB(1, :) DB(2, :) · · · DB(K, :) DB(K + 1, 1) · · · DB(K + 1,m)
W11 W
2
1 · · · W
K
1 C(1, :)W1 · · · C(m, :)W1
W12 W
2
2 · · · W
K
2 C(1, :)W2 · · · C(m, :)W2
We now verify that the MDS storage criterion is satisfied, i.e., both messages can be recovered
from the storage of any T = mK databases. The two message segments W1,W2 are encoded
in the same manner, so it suffices to consider one segment, say segment 1,W1. Suppose among
the T = mK databases, T1 ≤ (m − 1)K databases are from the first K database groups and the
12
remaining T − T1 databases are from the (K + 1)-th database group. The T1 databases from the
first K database groups contribute T1 raw message symbols from W1, then we only need to show
that the remaining T − T1 symbols from W1 can be recovered from the T − T1 databases of the
(K + 1)-th database group. This is equivalent to prove that a (T − T1) × (T − T1) sub-matrix of
the Cauchy matrix C ∈ Fm×mKq has full rank, which trivially holds for any Cauchy matrix.
PIR Code: When we retrieve W k, the answers are shown in the following table.
Table 11: Answers for W k.
F DB(1, :) · · · DB(k, :) · · · DB(K, :) DB(K + 1, 1) · · · DB(K + 1,m)
1 W11 · · · W
k
2 · · · W
K
1 C(1, :)W1 · · · C(m, :)W1
2 W12 · · · W
k
1 · · · W
K
2 C(1, :)W2 · · · C(m, :)W2
Correctness and Privacy: Privacy follows from the observation that no matter which message
is desired, the answer from any database is equally likely to come from message segment 1 or 2. To
see correctness, note that all non-desired message symbols appeared in answers from the (K+1)-th
database group are directly downloaded thus can be cancelled. m desired symbols are directly
downloaded and the other m desired symbols can be successfully recovered because the m linear
combinations of desired symbols downloaded from the (K + 1)-th database group have full rank
(note that C ∈ Fm×mKq is a Cauchy matrix). The rate achieved is
2
K+1 as L = 2m and we have
downloaded one symbol from each of the m(K + 1) databases.
5.2 From (2, N, 2) to (2, mN, 2m) Systems
We show that C(2,mN, 2m) > C⊥(2,mN, 2m), where N ≥ 3 and m is a positive integer. Similar
to the reasoning in the previous section, it suffices to provide a joint MDS storage code for a
(2,mN, 2m) system that achieves the PIR rate N−1N (same as that of a (2, N, 2) system from
Section 4). The idea is also based on splitting the messages and databases. Let us start with an
example where N = 4,m = 2.
5.2.1 Example: N = 4,m = 2
The message size is multiplied by m = 2 so that we set L = m(N − 1) = 6 and each message
consists of 6 symbols from Fq, where q will be specified later. At this point, it is useful to view q as
a sufficiently large prime number. Denote W 1 = (a0;a1;a2), where ai = (ai; a
′
i), i ∈ {0, 1, 2} and
W 2 = (b0;b1;b2), where bi = (bi; b
′
i), i ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
Storage Code: Each database stores LKT = 3 symbols, as specified in the following table.
Define
hi = (hi, h
′
i) ∈ F
1×2
q ,gi = (gi, g
′
i) ∈ F
1×2
q , i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 12}. (60)
We will show that there exist feasible choices of hi,gi. Specifically, we may choose hi, h
′
i, gi, g
′
i i.i.d.
and uniform over Fq.
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Table 12: Stored Variables.
(DB1, DB2) (DB3, DB4) (DB5, DB6) (DB7, DB8)
(a0, a
′
0) (b0, b
′
0) (h1a1 + g1b0,h2a1 + g2b0) (h7a2 + g7b0,h8a2 + g8b0)
(a1, a
′
1) (b1, b
′
1) (h3a2 + g3b1,h4a2 + g4b1) (h9a0 + g9b1,h10a0 + g10b1)
(a2, a
′
2) (b2, b
′
2) (h5a0 + g5b2,h6a0 + g6b2) (h11a1 + g11b2,h12a1 + g12b2)
To verify the MDS storage criterion, we need to show that both messages can be recovered from
the storage of any 4 databases. The detailed proof is deferred to the general proof presented in the
next section and we give a sketch here. Every 4 databases contribute 12 linear combinations on the
12 message symbols and this linear mapping is given by a 12× 12 matrix. We view its determinant
polynomial as a function of variables (hi, h
′
i, gi, g
′
i). As shown in the general proof, these determinant
polynomials are not zero polynomials. Overall we have
(8
4
)
determinant polynomials and each
polynomial has degree at most 12. Consider the product of all such determinant polynomials,
which is another polynomial with degree at most 12×
(8
4
)
. Therefore by Schwartz-Zippel lemma, if
we set q > 12 ×
(
8
4
)
, then the probability that this product polynomial evaluates to 0 is non-zero.
In other words, we have found a feasible choice of (hi, h
′
i, gi, g
′
i) that guarantees the storage code
satisfies the MDS criterion.
PIR Code: The PIR code is almost identical to that when m = 1. When we retrieve W 1, the
answers are shown in the following table.
Table 13: Answers for W 1.
(DB1, DB2) (DB3, DB4) (DB5, DB6) (DB7, DB8)
(a0, a
′
0) (b0, b
′
0) (h1a1 + g1b0,h2a1 + g2b0) (h7a2 + g7b0,h8a2 + g8b0)
(a1, a
′
1) (b1, b
′
1) (h3a2 + g3b1,h4a2 + g4b1) (h9a0 + g9b1,h10a0 + g10b1)
(a2, a
′
2) (b2, b
′
2) (h5a0 + g5b2,h6a0 + g6b2) (h11a1 + g11b2,h12a1 + g12b2)
When we retrieve W 2, the answers are shown in the following table.
Table 14: Answers for W 2.
(DB1, DB2) (DB3, DB4) (DB5, DB6) (DB7, DB8)
(a0, a
′
0) (b0, b
′
0) (h5a0 + g5b2,h6a0 + g6b2) (h9a0 + g9b1,h10a0 + g10b1)
(a1, a
′
1) (b1, b
′
1) (h1a1 + g1b0,h2a1 + g2b0) (h11a1 + g11b2,h12a1 + g12b2)
(a2, a
′
2) (b2, b
′
2) (h3a2 + g3b1,h4a2 + g4b1) (h7a2 + g7b0,h8a2 + g8b0)
Correctness and Privacy: Privacy is easily seen. To prove correctness, note that non-
desired symbols can be cancelled and we only need to ensure the received desired equations are
invertible to the message symbols. This claim follows from Schwartz-Zippel lemma that shows
(h2i−1;h2i) ∈ F
2×2
q , (g2i−1;g2i) ∈ F
2×2
q have full rank with non-zero probability over a sufficiently
large field. Here we have 12 matrices, each of which has dimension 2 × 2 and has a determinant
polynomial of degree at most 2.
Overall, we need to guarantee correctness and MDS criterion are simultaneously satisfied. Take
the product of all determinant polynomials, whose degree is at most 12 ×
(8
4
)
+ 12 × 2. So we set
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q > 12 ×
(8
4
)
+ 12 × 2 and by Schwartz-Zippel lemma, there exist a feasible choice of (hi, h
′
i, gi, g
′
i)
over Fq.
5.2.2 General proof: arbitrary N ≥ 3,m ≥ 2
We set L = m(N − 1) and each message consists of L symbols from Fq, where q is an integer
power of a prime number and is no fewer than 2m(N − 2)(N − 1) + 2m(N − 1)
(
mN
2m
)
. Denote
W 1 = (a0; · · · ;aN−2) ∈ F
m(N−1)×1
q , where ai = (ai,1; · · · ; ai,m) ∈ F
m×1
q , i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N − 2} and
W 2 = (b0; · · · ;bN−2) ∈ F
m(N−1)×1
q , where bi = (bi,1; · · · ; bi,m) ∈ F
m×1
q , i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N − 2}.
Storage Code: Each database stores LKT = N − 1 symbols. Denote the mN databases as
DB(1, 1), · · · ,DB(1,m), · · · ,DB(N,m). The stored variables Sn,j ∈ F
(N−1)×1
q , n ∈ {1, · · · , N}, j ∈
{1, · · · ,m} are set as follows.
Denote i = i mod (N − 1). For any j ∈ {1, · · · ,m},
S1,j = (S1,j,0; · · · ;S1,j,N−2) = (a0,j ; a1,j ; · · · ; aN−2,j) (61)
S2,j = (S2,j,0; · · · ;S2,j,N−2) = (b0,j ; b1,j ; · · · ; bN−2,j) (62)
Sn,j = (Sn,j,0; · · · ;Sn,j,N−2) = (hn,j,0an−2 + gn,j,0b0; · · · ;hn,j,N−2an+N−4 + gn,j,N−2bN−2),
n ∈ {3, · · · , N} (63)
where for any i ∈ {0, · · · , N − 2},
hn,j,i ∈ F
1×m
q ,gn,j,i ∈ F
1×m
q . (64)
The proof that there exist choices of hn,j,i,gn,j,i such that the above storage code satisfies the MDS
criterion is deferred to Section 5.2.3.
PIR Code: When we retrieve W 1, we download one symbol from each database and the
answers are set as follows. F is uniform over {0, 1, · · · , N − 2}. When F = f ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N − 2},
for any j ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m} we set
A
[1]
1,j = S1,j,f = af,j (65)
A
[1]
2,j = S2,j,f = bf,j (66)
A
[1]
n,j = Sn,j,f = hn,j,faf+n−2 + gn,j,fbf , n ∈ {3, · · · , N} (67)
When we retrieveW 2, the answers are set as follows. F is uniform over {0, 1, · · · , N−2}. When
F = f ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N − 2}, for any j ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m} we set
A
[2]
1,j = S1,j,f = af,j (68)
A
[2]
2,j = S2,j,f = bf,j (69)
A
[2]
n,j = Sn,j,f−(n−2) = hn,j,f−(n−2)af + gn,j,f−(n−2)bf−(n−2), n ∈ {3, · · · , N} (70)
Correctness and Privacy: Privacy is easy to verify. For any n, j, A
[1]
n,j and A
[2]
n,j are identically
distributed due to the modulo operation. Next consider correctness. Due to symmetry, we only
need to consider the case when W 1 is the desired message. From A
[1]
2,j,∀j ∈ {1, · · · ,m}, we have
obtained all non-desired symbols (bf,1; · · · ; bf,m) = bf . After canceling the contribution of bf from
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A
[1]
n,j, n ≥ 3, we need to show that for any n, f , the m×m matrix (hn,1,f ; · · · ;hn,m,f ) have full rank,
which follows from Schwartz-Zippel lemma over a sufficiently large field. We have 2(N − 2)(N − 1)
such matrices, each of size m ×m. The product of all these determinant polynomials has degree
at most 2m(N − 2)(N − 1).
5.2.3 Proof of MDS storage criterion
We show that when each element of hn,j,i,gn,j,i is drawn independently and uniformly from Fq, the
probability that the MDS criterion is satisfied is non-zero so that there exists a feasible choice.
Consider any T = 2m databases. We show that there exists an assignment of hn,j,i,gn,j,i so
that the mapping from the storage of the T databases to the 2L message symbols is invertible.
This shows that the 2L× 2L matrix that describes the linear mapping has a non-zero determinant
polynomial. Consider all choices of
(mN
2m
)
databases and take the product of all such determinant
polynomials. Each polynomial has degree at most 2L so the degree of the product polynomial is
at most 2L
(
mN
2m
)
. Therefore, over a sufficiently large field, by Schwartz-Zippel lemma there exists
a choice of hn,j,i,gn,j,i so that all polynomials evaluate to non-zero values and the storage code is
indeed MDS.
We are left to show that for any T = 2m databases, we may assign hn,j,i,gn,j,i (for a given choice
of T = 2m databases) so that the storage is able to recover all 2L message symbols. The proof is
based on a crucial property, stated in the following lemma. Define ~aj = (a0,j ; a1,j ; · · · ; aN−2,j),~bj =
(b0,j ; b1,j ; · · · ; bN−2,j), j ∈ {1, · · · ,m}.
Lemma 1 Consider any n ∈ {3, · · · , N}, j ∈ {1, · · · ,m}, there exists a choice of hn,j,i,gn,j,i, i ∈
{0, 1, · · · , N − 2} so that from Sn,j, we may obtain ~aj∗ for any j
∗ ∈ {1, · · · ,m} and another choice
of hn,j,i,gn,j,i, i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N − 2} so that from Sn,j, we may obtain ~bj∗ for any j
∗ ∈ {1, · · · ,m}.
Proof: [Proof of Lemma 1] The proof is fairly simple because Sn,j contains all symbols from
~aj∗ and ~bj∗ for any j
∗. Consider first Sn,j = ~aj∗ . For all i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N − 2}, set
gn,j,i = 0 (71)
hn,j,i = ej∗ (72)
where ej∗ is a 1 ×m unit vector so that only the element of the j
∗-th position is 1 and all other
elements are 0, then we have
Sn,j = (Sn,j,0; · · · ;Sn,j,N−2) = (hn,j,0an−2 + gn,j,0b0; · · · ;hn,j,N−2an+N−4 + gn,j,N−2bN−2)
(73)
= (hn,j,0an−2; · · · ;hn,j,N−2an+N−4) (74)
= (an−2,j∗; · · · ; an+N−4,j∗) (75)
which is a cyclic shift of ~aj∗ = (a0,j∗; a1,j∗ ; · · · ; aN−2,j∗).
The case of Sn,j = ~bj∗ follows similarly from the assignment given above.
Fix any T = 2m databases. Suppose T1 ≤ 2m databases are from DB(i, j) where i ∈ {1, 2}, j ∈
{1, · · · ,m} and they will contribute T1 distinct ~aj∗
1
and~bj∗
2
vectors. The remaining T−T1 databases
are from DB(n, j) where n ∈ {3, · · · , N}, j ∈ {1, · · · ,m} and our goal is to recover all remaining
T − T1 ~aj∗
3
and ~bj∗
4
vectors. We can identify a one-to-one mapping between the T − T1 databases
and the remaining (T − T1) ~aj∗
3
and ~bj∗
4
vectors, and apply Lemma 1 to find the assignment such
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that the ~aj∗
3
and ~bj∗
4
vectors are fully recovered. Hence from any T databases, we may recover
(~a1, · · · ,~am) and (~b1, · · · ,~bm), i.e., all symbols from W
1 and W 2. Therefore, there indeed exists a
choice of hn,j,i,gn,j,i for which the determinant polynomial is not zero.
Finally, we need to consider correctness and MDS criterion jointly and show that there exist
a single choice of hn,j,i,gn,j,i that satisfies both constraints at the same time. The product of
all determinant polynomials has degree at most 2m(N − 2)(N − 1) + 2m(N − 1)
(mN
2m
)
and as
q > 2m(N − 2)(N − 1) + 2m(N − 1)
(mN
2m
)
, Schwartz-Zippel lemma guarantees the existence of a
feasible choice.
6 Conclusion
We considered the problem of private information retrieval from MDS-coded databases. Different
from the prevailing approach in the literature where the messages are encoded separately using
MDS codes, we consider encoding and storing the messages jointly using an MDS code into the
databases. There are many cases for which by jointly MDS-coding, we can break the capacity barrier
of the separate coding MDS-PIR. To establish this result, two novel code constructions and the
corresponding PIR protocols are presented, and moreover, an expansion technique is introduced
to allow more general parameters. The capacity of PIR with joint MDS storage, especially the
converse side, remains an interesting future direction.
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